This essay contributes to the growing critique of
2 flow of research reports from gathering dust in the file cabinet? Thus far, the effort has not been especially impressive (Lindblom, 1990 ).
This is not to say that the social sciences have had no impact on public issues. To the contrary, the influence of social science is everywhere to be found in contemporary political discourse. But the role has been more to stimulate the political processes of policy deliberation than to provide answers or solutions to the problems facing modern societies. While such deliberation is generally acknowledged to be important to effective policy development, this "enlightenment function" is not the analytic mission the policy sciences have set for themselves (Weiss 1990 ). More ambitiously, the policy sciences have sought to develop methods and practices designed to settle rather than stimulate debates. Here I shall argue that this traditional understanding of the policy-analytic role represents an epistemological misunderstanding of the relation of knowledge to politics. Further, I
will attempt to show that the continued reliance on the narrow methodological perspective that informs this orientation hinders the field's ability to do what it can--and should--do: Improve the quality of policy argumentation in public deliberation.
Toward this end, the essay is divided into three parts. The first part locates policy analysis's problems in its neopositivist methods and the technocratic orientation to which they have given rise.
[1] The discussion traces the failures of the field to its understanding of the object of inquiry and its narrowly empirical approach to research. In this context, the neopositivist social sciences are seen to imitate an understanding of "science" that is no longer unquestioningly accepted even in the so-called hard sciences. In the second part of the paper the analysis turns to the postpositivist alternative. I.
MAINSTREAM POLICY ANALYSIS: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
Neopositivism (or logical empiricism) has supplied the epistemological ideals of the contemporary social and policy sciences (Hawkesworth 1988 ; A theory of knowledge put forth to explain the concepts and methods of the physical and natural sciences, neopositivism has given shape as well to a social science in pursuit quantitatively replicable causal generalizations (Fay 1975) . Most easily recognized as the stuff of the research methodology textbook, neopositivist principles emphasize empirical research designs, the use of sampling techniques and data gathering procedures, the measurement of outcomes, and the development of causal models with predictive power (Miller 1993; Bobrow and Dryzek 1987) . In the field of policy analysis, such an orientation is manifested in quasi-experimental research designs, multiple regression analysis, survey research, input-output studies, cost-benefit analysis, operations research, mathematical simulation models, and systems analysis (Putt and Springer, 1989; Sylvia, et al. 1991) .
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The only reliable approach to knowledge accumulation, according to this epistemology, is empirical falsification through objective hypothesis-testing of rigorously formulated causal generalizations (Popper, 1959: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1992:231; Hofferbert 1990 ).
The goal is to generate a body of empirical generalizations capable of explaining behavior across social and historical contexts, whether communities, societies, or cultures, independently of specific times, places, or circumstances. Not only are such propositions essential to social and political explanation, they are seen to make possible effective solutions to societal problems. Such propositions are said to supply the cornerstones of theoretical progress.
Underlying this effort is a fundamental positivist principle mandating a rigorous separation of facts and values, the principle of the "fact-value dichotomy" (Bernstein 1976; Proctor 1991) . According to this principle, empirical research is to proceed independently of normative context or implications. Because only empirically based causal knowledge can qualify social science as a genuine "scientific" endeavor, social scientists are instructed to assume a "value-neutral" orientation and to limit their research investigations to empirical or "factual" phenomena. Even though adherence to this "fact-value dichotomy" varies in the conduct of actual research, especially at the methodological level, the separation still reigns in the social sciences. To be judged as methodologically valid, research must at least officially pay its respects to the principle (Fischer 1980 ).
In the policy sciences the attempt to separate facts and values has facilitated a technocratic form of policy analysis that emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness of means to achieve politically established goals. Much of policy analysis, in this respect, has sought to translate inherently normative political and social issues into technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means. In 5 5 an effort to sidestep goal-value conflicts typically associated with policy issues, economic and social problems are interpreted as issues in need of improved management and program design; their solutions are to be found in the technical applications of the policy sciences (Amy 1987) . Often associated with this orientation has been a belief in the superiority of scientific decision-making. Reflecting a subtle antipathy toward democratic processes, terms such as "pressures" and "expedient adjustments" are used to denigrate pluralistic policymaking.
If politics doesn't fit into the methodological scheme, then politics is the problem. Some have even argued that the political system itself must be changed to better accommodate policy analysis (Heineman et al. 1990 ).
In the face of limited empirical successes, neopositivists have had to give some ground. Although they continue to stress rigorous empirical research as the long-run solution to their failures, they have retreated from their more ambitious efforts. Today their goal is to aim for propositions that are at least theoretically proveable at some future point in time. An argument propped up by the promise of computer advances, it serves to keep the original epistemology in tack. But the modification misses the point, as postpositivists are quick to point out. The problem is more fundamentally rooted in the empirical social scientists's misunderstanding of the nature of the social. As we shall see, it is a misunderstanding lodged in the very concept of a generalizable, value-free objectivity that neopositivists seek to reaffirm and more intensively apply.
POSTPOSITIVISM: THE CRITIQUE OF EMPIRICISM
The postpositivist challenge is rooted in both the natural sciences and the history and sociology of science. With the advent of quantum mechanics and chaos theory in physics and evolutionary theory in the biological sciences, growing numbers of scientists have come to 6 6 reject the Parmenidean worldview in favor of the Heraclitean conception of flux (Toulmin 1990) . From quantum theory and its postulate of indeterminacy we have learned that various aspects of the atomic level of reality are so influenced (or co-determined) by other dimensions of the same phenomena that such processes can no longer be described as determinate or predictable. Moreover, such research has led some physicists to argue that the explanation of the behavior of a particle depends in signifcant part on the vantage point from which it is observed (Galison 1997) . That is, in explaining important aspects of the physical world, where you stand can influence what you see.
Relatedly, chaos theory has demonstrated that an infintesimal change in any part of a system can trigger a transformation of the system at large (Kelllert 1993; Gleick 1987) . Such empirical phenonena are thus better defined as "participatory interminglings" than perceptions of objective things standing apart from human subjectivity. In short, the traditional understanding of the physical world as a stable or fixed entity is no longer adequate. For neopostpositivism, this poses a fundamental problem: it loses its firm epistemological anchor.
On the heels of these discoveries arrived new historical and sociological observations about the nature of scientific practices.
From these "post-empiricist" studies we have learned that both the undeniable validity--this collapse of authority was a primary concern (Wagner 1995 Beyond the historical dimension, sociological investigation has shown the elements of empirical inquiry--from observation and hypothesis formation through data collection and explanation--to be grounded in the theoretical assumptions of the sociocultural practices through which they are developed (Rouse 1987) . Detailed scrutiny of research practices turns up something quite at odds with the conventional view of the lone, disinterested scientist in the laboratory struggling to uncover the objective laws of nature (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; KnorrCetina and Mulkay 1983) . Time and time again sociological research has documented the extent to which science is as much a socio-cultural activity as a technical enterprise. Indeed, full understanding of scientific findings is incomprehensible apart from the socio-cultural settings which give them purpose and meaning. From Woolgar (1979) and 8 8 Collins (1985) to Foucault (1980) and Latour (1987) , scientific inquiry is recognized as a social practice contextually mediated through symbolic means. Its knowledge emerges as a socio-technical construction set in ongoing specific historical and linguisitic contexts of conjecture and refutation (Gottweis 1997) . Scientific accounts have to be understood as explanations proffered by a specific community of inquirers situated in particular places and times.
From such investigations we have come to see the degree to which the application of scientific methods to particular problems involves social and practical judgments. The model form of the experiment, for example, proves to be more than a matter of applying a causal research design to a given reality. As often as not, as Latour has shown, reality is discovered to be fitted to the empirical instrument. In some cases, scientists get their results by identifying and organizing those parts of reality that are amenable to the research design. In other cases, they go beyond such selection processes to restructure the social context (Rouse 1987) . Given such considerations, a proper assessment of research results has to go beyond an appraisal of empirical data to an examination of the practical judgments that shape both the instrument and the object. Although such judgments structure and guide the research process, they are almost never part of the research paper. The formal write-up of the results is organized to conform to the official judgment-free logic of science.
Nowhere is this assumption-laden character of social reality more problematic than in the case of the principle of falsification (Popper 1959) . With the recognition of the socially constructed character of a given reality, neopositivism's theory of falsification loses its fixed anchor to the social world. Because the empirical object the researcher seeks to measure is rooted in his or her own understanding of it (i.e., assumptions, expectations, and experience of 9 9 the very object), efforts to treat the world and its representations as isomorphic can only lead to misrepresentations (Hawkesworth 1988; and Bernstein 1976) . In the absence of firm connections between theoretical assumptions and empirical correspondence rules, that which is taken to be the "brute data" of the social realm must itself take its meanings from theoretical constructions, often the same ones undergoing the empirical test (Hawkesworth 1988) . That is, there can be no complete "factual" description entirely independent of the social circumstances under which it is made, science in effect measures an interpretation of the object rather than the object per se (Natter et al. 1995) . Under such circumstances, the possibility of conclusive disproof has to be largely ruled out.
Added to these difficulties is the problem of complexity.
Because of the ocean of phenonmenon and experiences that constitute the social realm, empirical research proceeds through the isolation and correlation of a small number of variables. Given both inconclusiveness of available data, it is technically impossible to fully isolate an "if- anomalies nor unresolved problems turn out to be enough to ensure the rejection of specific theories. Like other forms of inquiry, science is found to be rooted in the human conventions of the community of scholars struggling to resolve particular problems under specific historical conditions. Offering no ready court of appeals, the promise of intersubjective reliability can no longer be held out as insurance against either human fallibility or social convention. Falsification not only fails as a guide to empirical research design, but as a theory of professional conduct as well.
None of this means that science, whether physical or social,
should not be taken seriously. It means rather that the thing we call science has to be understood as a more subtle interaction between physical and social factors. Whatever constitutes scientific truth at any particular time has to be seen as more than the product of empirically confirmed experiments and tests. Such truths are better described as scientific interpretations or beliefs based on an amalgam of technical and social judgments. In some cases, the technical judgments are more decisive than in others, but both technical and social considerations are always involved (with the mix between the two remaining an question to be empirically examined case by case).
Influenced by many more factors than the mere pursuit of truth, such claims have to be understood as the relative product of a community of The advance of knowledge, in short, cannot be understood as a linear process driven by the better experiment.
From this perspective, there can be no such thing as a "fact" as the term is conventionally understood. Facts, in the natural as well as the social world, depend upon underlying assumptions and meanings. What is taken to be a fact is in effect the decision of a particular community of inquirers who work within a set of theoretical presuppositions to which they subscribe. Customarily, of course, we simply accept a particular view of the world; the presuppositions which undergird it seldom come into play. This makes it possible, at least most of the time, to treat large parts of the world as natural and
given. While such an organization of reality facilitates communication and understanding between social actors, it cannot serve as an adequate basis for social research. Beyond seeking to explain a "given" reality, 12 social science must also attempt to explain how social groups construct their own understandings of that reality. Not only do such constructions constitute the most basic level of social action, their implications are fundamental to an understanding of the processes of social change, without which we would have little need for social science. The failures of social science can in significant part be attributed to the neglect of these subjective processes.
Nowhere are the implications of this critique more important than in the study of politics and public policy. As the network of presupposed assumptions underlying social and political propositions are reflections of particular social arrangements, the assumptions are themselves influenced by politics and power. Not only is one of the basic goals of politics to change an existing reality, much of what is important in the struggle turns on the sociopolitical determination of the assumptions that define it. As many scholars have made clear, policy politics is itself about establishing definitions of and assigning meaning to social problems (Edelman 1988; Gusfield 1981) .
Thus, the effort to exclude meaning and values from the work of the policy analyst cuts the very heart out of political inquiry.
Neopositivism, in its search for such value-neutral generalizations, have sought to detach itself from the very social contexts that can give its data meaning.
Seen in this light, empirical findings can at best only be relevant to the particular socio-historical understanding of reality from which they are abstracted. Moreover, positivism's attempt to empirically fix a given set of social and political arrangements tends to reify a particular reality. By neglecting or diverting attention from the struggles to challenge and change such arrangements, social science--wittingly or unwittingly--serves as much to provide ideological support for a configuration of power as it does to explain it.
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Both the interpretive nature of the social object and the meaning of the empirical findings themselves render neopositivist science an easy target for those who wish to dispute the validity of specific experiments or object to particular claims. At best, such research can offer a rigorous and persuasive argument for accepting a conclusion.
But such an argument cannot prove the issue. Those who dispute a claim can easily find problems in the myriad social and technical interpretations and assumptions embedded in both the research design and practice. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the endless confrontations over the validity of claims made by environmental scientists. Such disputes have given rise to a full-scale politics of "counter-expertise" (Fischer 1995) . Working with the same findings, groups on both sides of an issue easily construct their own alternative interpretations of the evidence.
This is not to say that it is never worth carrying out an empirical test. The postpositivist objective is not to reject the scientific project altogether, but to recognize the need to properly understand what we are doing when we engage in any form of research.
Postpositivism, in this respect, can be explained as an attempt to understand and reconstruct that which we are already doing when we engage in scientific inquiry. Recognizing reality to be a social construction, the focus necessarily shifts to the nature of situational context and to the discursive processes which shape the construction.
We turn at this point to that alternative understanding.
II.

POSTPOSITIVSM: FROM PROOF TO INTERPRETATION
In view of this sociology of scientific practices, postpositivism focuses on science's account of reality rather than on reality itself.
Which is not to say there are no real and separate objects of inquiry independent of the investigators. It is not the objects or their 14 14 properties per se, but rather the vocabularies and concepts used to know and represent them that are socially constructed by human beings.
Scientific accounts are produced by observers with different ideational frameworks, types of educational training, research experience, perceptual capacities, etc. The goal is to understand how these varying cognitive elements interact to discursively shape that which comes to be taken as knowledge. Toward this end, postpositivism's reconstruction of the scientific process is founded on a "coherence" theory of reality that emphasizes the finite and temporally bounded character of knowledge (Brown 1977; Stockman 1983 ).
In contrast to neopositivist correspondence theory which sees scientific concepts as direct referents of reality, coherence theory addresses the indeterminedness of empirical propositions.
[3]
Seeking to describe a world that is richer and more complex than the neopositivist theories constructed to explain it, coherence theory seeks to capture and incorporate the multiplicity of theoretical perspectives and explanations that bear on a particular event or phenomenon. To use Toulmin's (1983:113) shifts from the narrow concerns of empirical-analytic theory to the development of "a rich perspective" on human affairs (Toulmin 1990:27) .
Knowledge, in this evolving conversation, is more accurately understood as consensually "accepted belief" than as proof or demonstration (Paller 1989) . Such beliefs emerges through an interpretive forging of theoretical assumptions, analytical criteria, and empirical tests discursively warranted by scholarly communities (Lauden 1977) . With one decisive exception, this description is consistent with the neopositivist understanding of the process.
Instead of understanding these beliefs as the empirical outcomes of intersubjectively reliable tests, the postpositivist sees them as the product of a chain of interpretive judgments, both social and technical, arrived at by researchers in particular times and places (Bernstein 1983) . From this perspective, social scientific theories can be understood as assemblages of theoretical presuppositions, empirical data, research practices, interpretive judgements, voices, and social strategies (Deleuze and Guatarri 1987) . One of the primary strengths of a theory, in this respect, is its ability to establish discursive Before turning to practical reason, it is important to note that in recent years some attention has been given to these qualitative concerns. For example, a number of leading empiricists have begun to concede ground to qualitative methods (See Ann Chih Lin in this Symposium). In particular, the work of Koehane, King, and Verba (1994) has generated a good deal of discussion. solve. These new efforts, as such, are best understood as one more effort to patch up the cracks in a troubled enterprise.
As we have argued in this section, the formal logic scientific deduction is too confining for a methodology that needs to meaningfully combine quantitative and qualitative orientations in a new methdological configuration. We turn at this point to the postpositivist alternative, informal logic and practical discourse.
PRACTICAL REASON AS REASONING-IN-CONTEXT
The search for an alternative begins with the recognition that that the formal models of deductive and inductive reason misrepresent both the scientific and practical modes of reason. As Scriven (1987) writes, "the classical models of reasoning provide inadequate and in fact seriously misleading accounts of most practicial and academic reasoning--the reasoning of the kitchen, surgery and workshop, the law courts, paddock, office and battlefield; and of the discliplines. what is "logical" in geometrical theory or physics (Toulmin 1990 ).
Basic to such judgment is a sensitivity to the contextual circumstances of an issue or problem. Practical reason, as such, distinguishes contextually between the world of theory, the mastery of techniques, and the experiential wisdom needed to put techniques to work in concrete cases. In doing so, it supplies a conception of reason that more accurately corresponds to the forms of rationality exhibited in realworld policy analysis and implementation, concerns inherently centered around an effort to connect theory and techniques to concrete cases.
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Practical deliberation thus seeks to bring a wider range of evidence and arguments to bear on the particular problem or position under investigation. As Hawkesworth (1988) need not lead to a hopeless relativism, as is often thought. Because the hermeneutic process is typically initiated by external stimuli in the object-oriented world, critical interpretations are "world-guided" and can never be altogether detached from the world (Williams 1985:145) .
That is, in the words of Bernstein (1983:135) , the process "is 'object' oriented in the sense that it directs us to the texts, institutions, 
III.
POLICY-ANALYTIC IMPLICATIONS: THE EMPIRICAL IN NORMATIVE CONTEXT
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The kinds of epistemological concerns presented above are quite different from those normally encountered in policy analysis and not at all well received in some quarters. In most cases the critical question raised rests on with the status of the empircal: What happens to empirical research in a discursive approach? Although many postpositivist writers have not been clear enough on this question, one point is certain--a discursive model of policy inquiry must include empirical investigation. Indeed, rather than rejecting the empirical, the issue here concerns its relationship to the normative. How the empirical is situated in a larger set of normative concerns that give its findings meaning is the question that must be addressed.
What, then, does it mean to say that policy analysis should embrace this discursive or "argumentative turn" (Fischer and Forester 1993) . From science studies we learn that scientific conclusions are in fact arguments designed to convince other scientists to see a particular phenomenon one way or another. Although findings are traditionally put forth in the language of empirical verification--advanced as evidence that a proposition is true or false--quantitative data are only a part of a broader set of factors that go into structuring the conclusion. As we have discussed earlier, behind these conclusions are a multitude of interpretive judgments, both social and technical. The conclusion as a whole can in fact be better understood as an argument rather than an inductive or deductive proof.
What does it mean for policy analysis to say that its socialscientific conclusions are arguments? One of the first policy scholars to call for such a reorientation is Giandomico Majone. The structure of a policy argument, Majone (1989:63) writes, is typically a complex blend of factual statements, interpretations, opinion, and evaluation. The argument provides the links connecting data and information with the conclusions of an analysis. Having recognized the epistemological 22 22 shift, however, Majone has not sufficiently clarified the normative dimensions that intervene between findings and conclusions. From the preceding discussion we can now formulate the task as a matter of establishing interconnections among the empirical data, normative assumptions (that structure our understanding of the social world), the interpretive judgments involved in the data collection process, the particular circumstances of a situational context (in which the findings are generated and/or to which the conclusions apply), and the specific conclusions. The acceptability of the conclusions ultimately depends on the full range of interconnections, not just the empirical findings.
While neopositivists argue that their approach is more rigorous and therefore superior to less-empirical, less-deductive methods, this model of policy argumentation actually makes the task more demanding and complex. Not only does it encompass the logic of empirical falsification, it includes the equally sophisticated normative questions within which it operates. The researcher still collects the data, but now has to situate or include it in the interpretive framework that gives it meaning. No longer is it possible to contend that such normative investigations can be ignored, as if they somehow relate to another field of inquiry.
Elsewhere I have suggested a multimethodological framework for integrating these concerns. In Evaluting Public Policy, I have offered a logic of four interrelated discourses that outline the concerns of a more comprehensively rational policy evalution (Fischer 1995) .
Extending from the concrete questions concerning the efficency of a program up through its situational context and the societal system to the abstract normative questions concerning the impact of a policy on a particulary way of life, the scheme illustrates how empirical concerns can be brought to bear on the full range of normative questions.
TOWARD A POLICY SCIENCE OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES
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Beyond the issues of methodology, the postpositivist model of practical deliberation holds out important implications for transforming the institutional structures and practices of policymaking more generally. Most important is its potential democratizing influence on policy evaluation, an idea not as unique as it might sound. Although policy analysis has primarily emerged as a technocratic discipline, the concern for democracy has always been present. Indeed, as early as 1951, Lasswell put the discipline forward as the "policy science of democracy." Postpositivism is an effort to make good on that claim. In this closing section, we examine some of the larger normative and political issues which frame this effort. interpretations (Danziger 1995; Stone 1988) . In particular, attention has to be paid to context. As Healey (1993:238) writes, "knowledge for action, principles of action, and ways of knowing are actively constituted in the particularities of time and place." "Good" and "right" actions are "those we can come to agree on, in particular times and places, across our diverse differences in material conditions and wants, moral perspectives, and expressive cultures and inclinations."
The fundamental goal of such policy analysis can be reformulated as discovering ways of "living together differently but respectfully" (Healey 1993: 238) .
Especially important, in this view, is the need to rethink the relationships of the roles of the analysts, citizens and the decision 25 25 makers. As critical studies of social epistemology make clear, a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of an open and democratic exchange must confront the need to bring these roles together in a mutual exploration. Experts must establish a participatory or collaborative relationship with the citizen/client (Hawkesworth, 1988; Schon, 1983; Healey 1997) . Methodologically, an approach capable of facilitating the kind of open discussion essential to a participatory context is needed. Such a method would provide a format and a set of procedures for organizing the interactions between policy experts and the lay citizens that they seek to assist. Albeit in quite different ways, writers such deLeon (1992), Durning (1993) , Laird (1993) and Fischer (1990) have called for such a "participatory policy analysis."
In this formulation, the expert serves as "facilitator" of public learning and political empowerment. Rather than providing technical answers designed to bring political discussions to an end, the task of the analysts-as-facilitator-is to assist citizens in their efforts to examine their own interests and to make their own decisions (Fischer 1990; Caldwell 1975) . The facilitator seeks to integrate the process of evaluation with the empirical requirements of technical analysis.
Bringing together the analytical perspectives of social science and the competing normative arguments of the relevant participant in the policymaking process, the interaction can be likened to a conversation in which the horizons of both citizens and social scientists are extended through a mutual dialogue (Dryzek 1982) .
One approach to such a facilitative orientation has been called the "counsel model." Designed to outline a "postpositivist concept of objectivity," Jennings (1987) has put the model forward to reshape the the relationship of policy analysts to both citizens and policymakers.
The goal is to encourage a conversation with many voices, adjudicated by the procedural standards of a discourse ethics. Taking this approach, 26 26 the analyst first seeks "to grasp the meaning or significance of contemporary problems as they are experienced, adapted to, and struggled against by the reasonable, purposive agents, who are members of the political community." He or she then works "to clarify the meaning of those problems" in a way "that strategically located political agents (public officials or policymakers) will be able to devise a set of efficacious and just solutions to them." Finally, the analyst attempts to guide "the selection of one proffered policy from that set in light of a more general vision of the good of the community as a whole, as well as the more discreet interests of the policymakers themselves."
Emphasizing a procedural route to policy choice, the model strives to interpret the public interest in a way that can survive an open and nondistorted process of deliberation and assessment. Importantly, in the process, interpreting the world and changing it are understood as complementary endeavors. The analyst-as-counselor seeks to "construct an interpretation of present political and social reality that serves not only the intellectual goal of explaining or comprehending that reality, but also the practical goal of enabling constructive action to move the community from a flawed present toward an improved future" (Jennings 1987:127) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has examined the postpositivist challenge to the conventional neopositivist epistemology of the social sciences and Nowhere are the implications of this alternative understanding more important than in the contemporary policy curriculum. Still dominated by an outmoded conception of scientific epistemology, the social and policy sciences ill-equip their students (especially doctoral students) for the world they are sent out to confront. Armed with empirical research designs and statistical methods, many often have little or no training in either understanding the normative and interpretive foundations of the tools they have learned to rely upon, or the social settings to which these techniques are to be applied. Some, to be sure, recognize these interpretive dimensions of the practice, but for reasons of examination and employment are compelled to concentrate on empirical methods. As students come to see the limits of these methods, as many do, the disciplinary neglect of these issues and concerns can breed more than a little cynicism. Some are simply turned off; others go through the academic ritual but turn away from--if not against--these methods after jumping over the requisite set of hurdles.
For a long time, the argument against changing the curricular focus has turned on the problem of alternatives. Given the absence of credible alternatives, so the argument has gone, it is better to hang on to the traditional--albeit problematic--methods than to step into a methodological void. But this no longer need be the case. [2] There is no standard definition of "postpositivism." Most fundamentally, it is grounded in the idea that reality exists, but can never be fully understood or explained, given both the multiplicity of causes and effects and the problem of social meaning. Ojectivity can serve as an ideal, but requires a critical community of interpreters.
Critical of empiricism, it emphasises the social construction of theory and concepts, and qualitative approaches the discovery of knowledge.
(Egon Guba 1990) . McCarthy (1978) has defined the task of developing a postpositivist methodology of social inquiry as figuring out how to combine the practice of political and social theory with the methodological rigor of modern science.
[3] On the "correspondence theory" of truth see Lincoln and Guba (1985:22) . As they put it, "The scientist...can capture the external facts of the world in propositions that are true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not. Science is idealistically a linguistic system in which true propositions are in one-to-one relation to facts, including facts that are not directly observed because they involve hidden entities and or properties, or past events or far distant events." The truth of a proposition is established through deduction, following upon certain assumptions. Rational choice theory, based on "given" assumptions about rational action, is the most rigorous contemporary representative of this "hypothetico-deductive model" of explanation. "Coherence theory," by contrast, judges the truth of a proposition in terms of its fit (or coherence) with experience as a whole.
Unlike correspondence theory, coherence theory insist on investigating and rendering judgments on the "givens. 
